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ALAN B. MORRISON* 
A Tribute to Arthur Miller 
rthur Miller is a man of many talents who is widely admired for 
his varied achievements.  He is an author of the leading 
casebook and treatise on civil procedure.  He served for six years as 
the Reporter for the U.S. Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules (and then as a member of that Committee for a like 
period), and he is an accomplished litigator. 
But if you took a poll in the legal community and asked which 
word comes first to your mind when Arthur’s name is mentioned, 
“teacher” would almost certainly be the overwhelming choice.  The 
Article I contribute to this Symposium is dedicated to Arthur as a 
teacher who is always seeking new ways to help his students unravel 
the mysteries of civil procedure. 
Law students almost universally find Civil Procedure to be their 
most challenging course.  They have some intuitions about criminal 
law, torts, and even contracts, but procedure baffles them, and not just 
because most of us begin the course with two topics that no one who 
has not been to law school has even heard of: personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Everyone who has taught procedure has his or her 
own way of dealing with this seemingly intractable problem, none of 
which is the equivalent of the Rosetta Stone, but all of which provide 
insights that open some previously closed doors. 
The Article offers one insight that is embraced in Arthur’s 
approach to civil procedure: rules must be practical, they must serve 
social purposes, and they must provide solutions to real problems 
with all the tradeoffs that those solutions entail.  Despite what most 
students believe, the primary purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure is not to confuse or annoy students.  Rather, they were 
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created to solve specific problems in achieving justice in civil 
litigation in the federal courts.  Moreover, students should realize that 
the Rules are part of a system.  Thus, if one Rule is changed, it is 
likely to affect others, and hence the potential ripples of a change 
need to be considered.  Finally, and this is the focus of my Article, 
procedural rules are more than mechanical instructions based on 
eternal truths as to how cases are to be litigated.  Instead, they involve 
significant tradeoffs that must be recognized in order to understand 
what the Rules do and to decide whether another alternative to a 
particular Rule would be preferable.  Students learn fairly quickly that 
the substantive law embodies many such tradeoffs, but the inevitable 
tradeoffs in procedural rules are less obvious. 
Tradeoffs come in two basic types.  First, there is a choice between 
a bright-line rule—for example, providing twenty-one days under 
Rule 12 to answer a complaint or allowing “timely” interventions 
under Rule 24.  The Rules do not opt for one alternative but include 
some of each, and students need to understand why different 
situations call for different answers.  A Rule that provides a clear, 
direct answer avoids litigation, which is good because it reduces 
delays and expense, but it does so at the cost of having less flexibility 
to decide what the “right” or most “just” answer is on the facts of the 
particular case.  The drafters of a Rule must make a choice as to what 
type of Rule to write, and students should understand what tradeoffs 
are involved in making that decision. 
The second set of tradeoffs is the more common one, in which the 
Rule must balance interests of the relevant parties.  Those parties 
include plaintiffs and defendants, but also in some cases third parties 
such as witnesses, class members under Rule 23, judges, jurors, and 
other litigants waiting their turn to have their cases heard.  The easiest 
example for grasping this tradeoff is Rule 8 and the level of 
specificity required for a plaintiff to avoid a motion to dismiss: if the 
threshold is low, more plaintiffs will have an opportunity to take 
discovery and prove their case, but at the cost of forcing defendants to 
litigate claims that may be dismissed before trial (often after costly 
discovery, which is another area rife with tradeoffs).  Students should 
recognize both the necessity for tradeoffs and the nature of them for 
each Rule in order to understand what the Rule does and how it 
should be interpreted. 
Although I am a novice in events such as this, I imagine that many 
authors would worry about whether the honoree would be pleased 
with his or her offering.  I am fortunate to know the answer to that 
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question because this Article was made available at the May 2010 
Civil Litigation Conference at Duke Law School, in which Arthur and 
I participated.  Arthur read the Article and was kind enough not only 
to tell me he liked it, but also to offer his help in finding a law review 
to publish it.  I doubt that he envisioned that a tribute to him would be 
the vehicle for doing so. 
Arthur has had a major impact on the teaching and implementation 
of civil procedure for both federal and state courts in the United 
States.  I am honored to be a small part of this celebration of his work 
as teacher, drafter, litigator, treatise and textbook author, and much 
more. 
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